Congress, the judicial system , the executive branch, human rights groups: band aid help but no solution
Understanding how the government and international human rights community operate. An example: "Declining Congressional Behavior of Congressional Intelligence Committees in the 1970s and the 1990s"
Please note: This section is a 1996 'A' college paper. The democratic congressional system does not work for illegal experimentation. This lesson can be applied as well to other branches of government and the international human rights community. Victims will have to be resourceful and realize that the system is biased and unfair. I hope that the next victim will not go through the time and expense that I did to find this out.
Intelligence Committee behavior from the 1970s to the 1990s: a decline
Congressional behavior can be analyzed by examining the congressional intelligence committees in the 1970s and in the 1990s. The overall trends of decentralization, the influence of money, iron triangles, (military, congress, industry alliances) and the congressional bureaucracy will show that as in many other congressional issues, the system is not meeting it's goals. This ongoing declining trend can be seen by looking at the history and accomplishments of the intelligence committees during the last thirty years. The CIA was labeled a rogue elephant during the 1970 congressional investigative hearings and unfortunately is seen in the same light today. The CIA has increased it's power and has weakened democracy.
The intelligence committees are a special congressional case because of national security and secrecy issues. Secrecy conflicts with democratic principles and democracy has been the underdog in this balancing act. Congressional intelligence committees are less accountable to U.S. citizens and more influenced by the military industry complex and politics. There are few whistleblowers and current laws do not encourage let alone protect them. Senator Moynihan is one of the few trustees of national and democratic principles who will stand up against the CIA. Unfortunately, he has had little overall effect on the behavior of the CIA.
Corruption is rampant. For example, Congresswoman Barbara Boxer reported that the National Security Act is used as a cover for scandals, paybacks and overpayments by the military-industrial complex. By unnecessarily classifying projects as black, there is accountability to no one. (Morrison, David "Dancing in the Dark." National Journal. 4-11-87, page 868) The congressional system itself is in need of change. For example, congressional bureaucracy rewards those who find loopholes in the law. The National Security Act was used to cover up the Iran Contra Affair and it's flagrant violations of the law by the Reagan administration and the CIA. Punishment for these white collar crimes was lessened as President Bush pardoned six of the accused Iran Contra players.
The 1990s political climate compared to the 1970s is perceived as more corrupt, more bureaucratic, more secretive and less democratic. Political policymakers such as the President and the Congress have to respond to the military industrial complex in order to receive support and lessen opposition to their reelection campaigns or proposed legislation. There are many other examples to support this declining trend.
Intelligence committees of the 1970s
The CIA was formed by the National Security Act of 1947 and has been independent of congressional oversight until the 1970s. It is critical to note that illegal CIA behavior has been discovered by leaks in a majority of the cases and not by monitoring functions of congress. The pattern then is a public outcry followed by congressional investigations. An internal CIA investigation called the "Family Jewels" was leaked in 1973 and behavior control LSD experiments and assassination plots conducted by the CIA became public knowledge. The 1974 and 1977 hearings took place and permanent intelligence committees were established for the first time.
It is a telling point that the intelligence committees were temporary or select committees. This is an indication of the CIA's influence to minimize monitoring of the CIA by Congress. It was only later that the committees became permanent.
The pattern since 1947 has been for congress to work on problems as they arise and to take no logical initiative since there is no political reward for confronting the CIA. An overall cold war philosophy has allowed abuses and patterns to continue. The CIA began when the antagonistic relationship with Russia developed into a cold war. An example of how Congress approaches a problem is the Watergate scandal in 1972 in which CIA employees were caught breaking into the Democratic party headquarters. There was a crisis and as public outcry faded, congress implemented a watered down revision and enforcement of the law.
Congressional committee leaders have had a major effect on the intelligence community. The Church committee had a very positive effect. Senator Frank Church was known for his ability to discipline members to keep secrets and for his thorough investigative approach. The Boren committee was well managed by Senator David Boren (D-OK) and he is responsible for implementing the recommendations of the Church and Iran-Contra committees, a very significant accomplishment. And there have been equally negative effects. In the House of Representatives, House Speaker Tom Foley was responsible for putting politics before efficiency and he chose several poorly qualified chairmen. (Smist, Frank J. Jr. "Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community Second Edition 1947-1994, U of Tennessee Press, 1994, page 307) The house intelligence committees have not always worked well with the executive branch or within the committee itself and politics have affected outcomes more often than in the Senate. The house members have proven less dedicated and less willing to spend time on unanimous consensus building as the Senate has successfully done.
Ongoing problems of the intelligence committees
The intelligence agencies are not empowered to make foreign policy but to carry out executive orders. There had been a long term covert policy from 1980 to 1992, in which the U.S. supported the Afgan rebels against the Soviets. The executive branch political reasoning was that the Soviets were paying a heavy price for their expansionistic policy (Smist, 327). But the World Trade Center Bombing was a direct and unexpected outcome of this covert policy. Arab militants associated with the Afghans were behind the bombing. Many questions are raised by the use of intelligence agencies by the executive branch, such as public unaccountability.
From 1947 to 1975, the CIA had an agreement with the president to shield the president from responsibility for his covert action decisions. This is known as "the doctrine of plausible deniability" and the CIA would take steps to divert the trail of responsibility for covert actions from the President to other sources. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified before the Pike committee: " Every operation is personally approved by the president." After this applied to every president since the CIA began (Smist,196). This was a step towards putting the blame onto the President and off of the CIA. The intelligence committees even had documentation to prove Kissinger's profound statement. But the intelligence committees were never able to prove or charge a president in any crime. The doctrine of plausible deniability was used to cover up illegal, unconstitutional activity by the president. This is another example of a turning point in democracy but the media missed it and the responsibility of the president for illegal covert actions was not to be enforced.
Up until 1991, congressional intelligence committees followed the political winds and at times would sidestep unpopular actions in order to please everyone but unfortunately accomplish little. By putting forth the relatively harmless proposal that most would accept, Congress monitored the CIA in a disproportionate and ineffective way. The CIA was increasing it's power and going unpunished for it's crimes. And the cold war was the perfect excuse for increasing secrecy.
National security vs. democratic principles: the special dilemma of intelligence committees
Kathryn S. Olmsted wrote a book about government secrecy after Watergate, entitled "Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI, 1995, U North Carolina. She sees a relationship between the investigative reporters deference to the CIA and congress. National security concerns and the cold war are used as an excuse for letting the CIA run rampant. The political climate favored the secrecy trend.
The National Security issues are conducted in closed congressional hearings and are not reported to the public. And what is reported about the CIA to the public is slanted and biased to favor the military-industrial complex and it's influence by money. It reflects a co-opted relationship of the congressional committees and the CIA. These are glaring examples of CIA unaccountability. It adds to public cynicism when the CIA is unaccountable to the U.S. public. Eventually the U.S. public and democracy will pay the price.
Recently, the CIA has stated that they have no files of radiation experiments and involvement by the CIA even when other government agencies have memos and documents to prove otherwise. (Radiation Advisory Committee. "Final Report: Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments" GPO, 1995) And on CSPAN's Washington Journal, May 6, 1996, there was an interview with Robert M. Gates, director of the CIA from 1991-3, on his new book, "From the Shadows". He state that William Colby, director of the CIA in the 1970s had to disclose to Congress the CIA family jewels list of abuses in congressional hearings and if Colby refused, then it would have destroyed the CIA. Colby was unpopular for his frank testimony and would not have been forthright if he did not feel political pressure to reveal the information. There was no law to impel Colby to tell the whole truth to the congressional committee and no reliable way for the congressional committee to insure that he was telling the truth.
Identifying the problems of the intelligence committees
A pitfall in managing oversight of the intelligence agencies is the lack of verification of information. The intelligence committees do not know the questions to ask because they may not know the covert actions that are classified. And the CIA directors are under no pressure to reveal all information since punishment is minimal for withholding information. It is not hard to believe that there is much that the intelligence agencies are not revealing that is illegal and going undetected.
There is currently no enforced or meaningful recourse for lying to congressional committees or other related illegal acts. Oliver North admitted that he lied to Congress. President Carter failed to notify Congress of the Iran hostage attempt as directed by law. He did not trust the Congress not to leak this information. And Congress is known for illegally leaking information. Senator Moynihan is notorious as was Les Aspin for leaking classified information. And information is leaked for political purposes. This unethical behavior adds to the public's perception of contempt for Congress. When combined with the fact that there are few checks and balances to the National Security Act, it becomes only a matter of time before abuse and corruption occur.
The unspoken congressional philosophy of bowing to the CIA and to sweeping problems out of the view of the American public are deeply entrenched. The U.S. public live a busy lifestyle and unless the problems of the CIA affect them directly, their limited time and energy will not be spent on seemingly remote problems. The CIA has many tools to keep their problems out of the public eye. Therefore, many political tools and congressional maneuverings can minimize illegal behavior. A good example of this is the Iran Contra Affair. The law was revised so that the National Security Act could not be an excuse for covering up a crime. This was a band aid remedy in the face of a major crisis.
Possible solutions
American and Congress are larger in size than ever before and cynicism, detachment and alienation are indicators that the congressional system should be improved. Since Watergate, the U.S. public have lost confidence and trust in the U.S. government. With democratic minded leaders, more education of the U.S. public could reverse some of the negative trends. The media has been used in a positive way by the intelligence committees. CNN broadcast the extensive hearing on the Robert Gates nomination for director of the CIA and the public was informed about the operations of the CIA
There has been little influence by clientele groups on the intelligence committees. There was no political muscle to exert and citizen groups such as the Committee on Law and National Security, a branch of the American Bar Association were ineffective in promoting civil liberties in any meaningful way. This is a critical area to change.
Congressional intelligence committees in the 1990s
A new report out on the "Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community" discusses how to reform the intelligence agencies now that the cold war is over. President Clinton appointed the Brown Commission and the report was released on March 1, 1996. The mission of the CIA since 1947 has been to collect and analyze intelligence for the NSC and the president. Suggested changes have included merging the CIA and FBI and a form of this has been recommended by the commission. After the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, this became a more popular view. Now there is an Intelligence-Law Enforcement Policy Board that combines the two agencies while keeping the agency charters separate. The Board now meets twice a week.
Other areas of debate within the commission is whether the CIA should be active in industrial espionage. The conclusion was not in favor of this. The CIA has been reported to have spied on Japanese negotiators in the bilateral auto talks. The CIA has violated many laws since 1947 and with little punishment, it is not surprising that they continue to do so.
In 1995, President Clinton also signed a classified order which outlined the intelligence community and it's goals. The users of CIA data outlined what they want the CIA to provide them. This is another example of the minimal amount of information available to the public and lack of monitoring or uninvolved third party to ensure that the U.S. intelligence agency spends tax dollars in legal and economically sound ways. There are political repercussions for the congressman who rocks the boat. It can be expected that this will continue.
Overall, new laws and legislation have not put the power in the hands of the majority but in the hands of the powerful and rich. These trends have continued for the last thirty years and a mechanism for correcting these trends is needed.
Congress will likely continue to have a relatively minimal role with the CIA. The bureaucracy will continue to reward corruption. Money and politics continues to negatively influence the behavior of congress. And in part, by shrewd political gameplaying, the CIA is stronger today than in the past.
Congress in the 1970s was new. Now it is established and should have improved. It would be expected to have a better record of carrying out it's congressional duties. The intelligence committees are more methodical and conduct appropriations tasks and uses the best congressional power, the power of the purse, over the CIA. There is more oversight and accountability by Congress but the corruption of the overburdened political process and U.S. public cynicism and apathy have outweighed it's progress. Overall, the performance of the congressional intelligence committees has declined.
Unbiased oversight, more accountability and national security vs. democracy issues need to be addressed. These should be top priorities. The congressional system has failed to correct these major problems and this is another indication of declining congressional behavior from the 1970s to the 1990s. Why has a major scandal, the Iran Contra Affair happened after the 1970s committee investigations into similar presidential and CIA abuses of power and illegal activities? Inadequate safeguards failed and this is another indication that the intelligence committees are not effectively performing their duties.
And as a closing and telling example of the continuing trends, congressional and presidential committees are discussing major reforms of the CIA now that the cold war is over. The CIA is promising that they are reforming but the U.S. public should at least understand the political game.
Footnotes
Hitchens, Christopher. "Unlawful, unelected, unchecked, How the CIA subverts the government at home." Sacramento Bee. 22 Sept. 1991
Internet alt.politics.org.cia H.R. 1655
Internet. Federation of American Scientists web page. U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. IC21- The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. The Intelligence Community Act of 1996.
Cooper, Mary H. "Reforming the CIA." Congressional Quarterly Researcher. 2 Feb. 1996
CSPAN. Commission on Protection and Reduction of Government Secrecy with Senator Patrick Moynihan. 1996.
Wise, David. "A Report That Blesses Espionage-as-Usual." Los Angeles times. 17 March 1996.
As a footnote on congressional political influence, pharmaceutical companies are very interested in human experimentation and are very politically powerfulUSA Today, 8-19-99 " The pharmaceutical industry spends more money on lobbying and campaign contributions than any other industry in the country. They spend more than the insurance industry, the tobacco companies, the oil companies, the gun lobby, and every other special interest."
The Executive branch: why there is a negative response
In the 1994 book, "The Semi-Sovereign Presidency Capitol Hill insider Charles Tiefer, acting general counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives, wrote about how President George Bush circumvented Congress and used National Security Directives to create law and obscure the facts from the public. Page 24 describes in detail this development of new national security powers in the executive branch. This is how the democratic system has worked in reality and in developing a strategy to stop nonconsensual experimentation, victims must account for it or waste their limited resources. Electromagnetic weapons are a national security issue and it is likely that directives would govern policy on their use.
The [National Security Act of ]1947 created the National Security Council, consisting of the president and vice president and certain Cabinet members, with one staffer, the executive secretary. .Occasionally, the NSC staff exercised authority through a new species of presidential directive. These directives were called National Security Council policy papers in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, National Security Action Memoranda in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, and Presidential Directives in the Carter Administration. These directives took on the perilous role of secret law: They authorized action and specified the limits of the action, just as a public law or a public executive order would. This Cold War history provided the tools used by President Bush's NSC to manage the courtship of Saddam Hussein in 1989 and 1990 and to hold back congressional oversight of this courtship in 1991 and 1992.Here is one of many examples of lack of help at the executive level of government. Sept. 3 1997 reply from ex-CIA director R. James Woolsey, "A quick perusal of the material you sent reveals nothing with which I am familiar." Woolsey was referring to the 1993 Jan 11-17, Defense News article on Russian soldiers and electromagnetic signals used to increase their fighting capabilities and similar articles, (see CAHRA [now Mind Justice] website). The counterargument of course would be, why does an ex-CIA director NOT know about these important weapons? Woolsey continued, in response to questions of allegations of U.S. mind control experiments, "Conspiracy theorists always seem to me to forget that we have: 9a) a First Amendment, (b) two independent branches of the federal government outside the executive, and (c) a federal system." The counterargument would be that this did not help radiation victims.
How the legal system operates: political influence at the Supreme Court level.
Former CIA officer during the Vietnam war, Frank Snepp wrote the 1999 book "Irreparable Harm" and discussed the CIA's law suits against him for allegedly not getting pre approval for any articles, books or speeches that deal with intelligence activities. His case went to the Supreme Court. Again, politics determined the negative outcome of the case. Snepps wrote a well documented chapter on how he found out after his Supreme court case that politics at the Supreme Court level affected the outcome of his case. He argued convincingly that Justice Powell used his influence on other Justices to form a majority opinion, based on Powell's personal political views and not the facts of the case. Snepp wrote,
" Seventeen years after the Snepp ruling, I visited the library to search these [Justice Marshall] for insights into how and why I'd been clobbered. .Justice Brennan gave me permission to examine his own private records of the case. Together with the Marshall files, they provided as complete an insider's perspective as I could have wished for. . Far from wanting to see my case deep-sixed, he [Powell] hoped to convince his brethren to take another look at it and to rule against me brutally. The proof of this is to be found in a document he circulated among them six weeks later. Bearing the title "Mr. Justice Powell Dissenting," it calls on the Court to take up my appeal for the sole purpose of destroying me financially. .The effect of this Sermon on the Mount was catalytic, .bringing five the number of justices who thought my appeal worth hearing on the most prejudicial grounds possible. .No one in the newly forged majority had bothered to examine the raw case files.On page 353, Snepp then described another revealing document by Justice Powell, which may explain Powell's crucial role in the court decision against Snepp. Snepp raised the question of whether Powell was "so viscerally antagonistic toward me [Snepp] and all I stood for that he couldn't possibly have voted any other way".
.I happened upon an extraordinary document he'd [Powell] written for the United States Chamber of Commerce in 1971, the year before he'd joined the courts. .this confidential memo titled "Attack on the American Free Enterprise System," No thoughtful person can question that the American economic system is under broad attack," he [Powell] remarked . He named the culprits: "the Communists, New Leftists." Among his most hated bugbears were Ralph Nader.and the ACLU.which Powell complained had exploited the judicial system to advance its liberal agenda " The national television networks should be monitored in the same way that textbooks should be kept under constant surveillance," he [Powell] said. [Snepp] concluded "to a man of these sensibilities, the Frank Snepp case must have seemed the payback opportunity of a lifetime.
Human rights organizations will not touch this issue: no political will
Joel Primack and Frank von Hippel wrote the 1974 book "Advice and Dissent, Scientists in the Political Arena". No doubt, national security policy comes before human rights and this is the harsh reality often overlooked by victims. Politics play a major role in the science community area also. Page 262 described the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Public organization officials and government officials overlap.
The FAS had been born in the post-war scientists' campaign for the assignment of responsibility for atomic energy to an agency under civilian control.) In the late 1960s at about the same time a substantial number of high-level government science advisors began to move outside government and work through the FAS-partly in order to bring before Congress the ABM debate. .and by 1972 a former head of the elite Jason group of Defense Department consultants, Marvin Goldberger, had succeeded former Director of Defense research and Engineering Herbert York in the (unsalaried) FAS chairmanship. .( In 1973, Jason shifted its affiliation to the Sanford Research Institute, another think-tank largely supported by the Defense Department.) . The AEC, NSF, and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) all devote several hundred million dollars annually toward sponsorship of research in universities and federal laboratories, .PSAC (President's Science Advisory Committee) members also supervised a number of scientific panels on specialized topics, consisting in all of several hundred scientists. was to provide independent advice on technological issues to the President .advice which could serve to check and counterbalance the sometimes self-serving recommendations sent to the White House by the executive-branch agencies.Dr. John Pike of the Federation of American scientists replied to a victim's request for help in an email dated Aug. 1998 and stated that, "the number of issues that they have the resources to work on is small relative to the possibilities." While he felt that "the victim's claims were based on adequately established technology, there are hundreds of issues and FAS chose not to address" this issue. Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International, also have chosen not to deal with this issue, even with repeated requests